Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 12

Number 2

Article 4

2006

Public-Private Partnerships: The Key to Sustainable
Microfinancing
Alexandra O'Rourke

Recommended Citation
Alexandra O'Rourke, Public-Private Partnerships: The Key to Sustainable Microfinancing, 12 LAW & BUS.
REV. AM. 179 (2006)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol12/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Law and Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: THE
KEY TO SUSTAINABLE MICROFINANCING
Alexandra O'Rourke*

I.

INTRODUCTION

HEN the United Nations (U.N.) declared 2005 the International Year of Microcredit, its main goals were to promote integrating microfinance into the international financial sector,
to help sustain microfinance efforts, and to encourage innovation and
strategic partnerships to expand microcredit's scope and reach around the
world.1 The efforts of the U.N. are especially important because only
about 1 percent of the world's 7000 microfinancing institutions (MFI) are
currently considered financially stable.2 This paper explores legal barriers to the sustainability of MFIs and argues that the international development community should promote formal partnerships between
commercial banks and MFIs. Creating structured partnerships between
commercial lending institutions and MFIs would provide the best longterm sustainability results and would allow MFIs to flourish as independent and vital parts of developing world financial systems, without threatening the security and stability of the financial systems supporting these
innovations.
Microfinancing is a vital tool for development in that it enables the
poor to build assets, increase income, and reach self-sufficiency. Additionally, microcredit encourages entrepreneurship and innovation in rural
and consumer goods sectors, which help grow and strengthen developing
countries' economies. Microcredit also moves small businesses from the
informal to the formal sectors, which increases stability and security and
broadens the tax base. MFIs fill a unique role in the financial system:
they provide capital for borrowers who would otherwise be priced out of
Villarreal O'Rourke is a third year J.D. candidate at Harvard Law
School. She has a degree in Finance from the University of Texas and an L.L.M. in
international law from Queen's University in Belfast. Ms. O'Rourke has worked
in international finance and aid projects with the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Migration, Population, and Refugees and with the United Nation's Development Program in BogotA, Colombia. She is currently conducting immigrationrelated research in Mexico through Harvard's Fredrick Sheldon Traveling
Fellowship.
1. International Year of Microcredit, 2005, G.A. Res. 53/197, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
RES/53/197 (Feb. 22, 1999), available at http://documents.un.org/mother.asp.
2. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, MICROFINANCE: A VIEW FROM THE FUND, 7
(2005), http://www.imf.org/External/np/pp/eng/2005/012505.pdf.
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the financial market, due to the high transaction costs associated with
very small loans as well as the high-risk nature of the smallest enterprises.
In the 1980s and 1990s, MFIs flourished as research and experience
began to show that MFI clients had excellent repayment histories and
could produce sufficiently high interest margins to sustain the institutions. 3 By the mid-1990s, over 900 institutions in more than 100 nations
provided approximately US $7 billion to over 14 million micro4
entrepreneurs.
Governments and international organizations, having once sponsored
the bulk of MFIs, began seeking ways to foster self-sustainability and independence among the institutions in order to eliminate the dependency
of state and non-governmental organization (NGO) funding. As governments pursued this development, legal barriers emerged that highlighted
some of the obstacles that could prevent MFIs from reaching full
sustainability.
Part II of this paper provides a brief background on the microfinancing
movement, including the goals of microfinancing, the types of institutions, and the historical shifts in the international approaches to MFIs.
Part III provides an analysis of some of the main legal barriers to MFI
sustainability, including minimum capital requirements, loss-prevention
regulation, limits on the savings and lending capabilities of MFIs, and
regulatory barriers that prevent the conversion of MFIs into banking
institutions.
Part IV analyzes existing legislative and structural alternatives designed to overcome those barriers that have been developed around the
world, such as lower capital requirements for MFIs, adjusted loss-prevention requirements, reliance on commercial loans or securities issuances
for fundraising, and the creation of partnerships with private commercial
lending institutions. This section argues that the latter alternative surpasses the others in its ability to create a permanent solution to MFI sustainability problems. Part V discusses the potential mid- and long-terms
effects of the proposed recommendation on both the MFI system and on
the financial industry in general.
II.

BACKGROUND ON MFIS AND THEIR REGULATION
A.

THE ORIGINS OF THE MICROFINANCING MOVEMENT

This Part sets the background for analysis by exploring the basis of the
microfinancing movement and describing the main characteristics of the
most common MFIs. In many regions of the developing world, particularly in rural areas, small informal businesses constitute a vital pillar of
the local economies, providing jobs and income for some of the world's
3.

The History of Microfinance, GLOBAL ENVISION Apr. 14, 2006, http://www.global
envision.org/library/4/1051/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
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poorest economies. These small enterprises-including farming operations, family businesses, or artesian cooperatives-have many of the same
financial needs as large companies, such as: cash flow management, risk
prevention, asset building, consumption stabilization, and consumer
credit provisions. 5 The difference between microbusinesses and regular
businesses is that, due to the small size of their financial needs, the transaction costs associated with financing often make it unprofitable for normal financial institutions to service them. In addition, the capital
requirement and minimum regulatory standards, established in most
countries to foster the security and stability of the banking system, often
leave small businesses out of the market altogether. Most importantly,
however, the high risk and small return inherent in the nature of small
less formal businesses often do not fit the interest and risk profiles of
banks and other financial institutions, which see these efforts as not prof6
itable enough to merit the high uncertainty.
Due to the lack of accessibility to formal avenues of financing,
microenterprises have traditionally been supported mostly by informal
institutions that have been around for hundreds of years in the developing world. 7 The informal bodies range from community savings groups
and lending circles to unofficial high-interest moneylenders and supplier
credit lines. 8 They provide starting and operational capital for the small-

est businesses. But the informality of these lending alternatives presents
important drawbacks. First, because lending circles and community partnerships often have rigid lending cycles and strict amounts, they lack the
flexibility and robustness needed to account for fluctuation in funding
needs. 9 In addition, reliance on informal money lenders and credit-line
providers often creates power dynamics that result in excessive interest
rates and continuous dependency.1 0 These obstacles significantly limit
the scope and growth of the businesses that depend on the informal
lenders.
The modern wave of MFIs began during the 1950s when development
projects first introduced subsidized credit programs that focused on rural
efforts."1 The true emergence of the modern microfinancing age, how5. See, e.g.,

MAKING FINANCIAL MARKETS WORK FOR THE POOR: GUIDELINES ON
MICROFINANCE (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Oct.

2004), available at http://www.sida.se/shared/jsp/download.jsp?f=SIDA4254enGuidelinesMFweb.pdf&a=3321#search=%22microfinance%20%20%22cash%20
flow%20management%22%20%22asset%20building%22%20%22consumer%20
credit%22%22 (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
6.

TOR JASSON & MARK WENNER, FINANCIAL REGULATION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
FOR MICROFINANCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

(Dec. 1997), availa-

ble at http://www.gdrc.org/icm/govern/iadb-jansson.pdf#search= %22microfinance
%20risk%20profile%20%22traditional%20financial%20institutions%22%22 (last
visited Sept. 11, 2006).
History of Microfinance, supra note 3.
About Microfinance: Overview, CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO AID THE POOR 2003,
http://www.cgap.org/about/microfinance.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ever, occurred during the 1970s and 1980s with the birth of microenterprise lending programs, which focused mostly on poverty alleviation
efforts that targeted the very poor and were often supplemented by
forced saving programs. 12 The main efforts were undertaken by non-governmental organizations such as the flagship Grameen Bank for the Poor
that focused on microfinancing as development aid. 13 Throughout the
1990s microfinancing continued to gain force as one of the key tools of
development. In addition to the emergence of international coalitions focused on microfinancing such as the world-wide Microcredit Summit
Campaign 14 and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor,' 5 the world's
largest development organizations, including the World Bank, the U.N.
Capital Development Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, have created full-scale movements to promote the
availability of microfinancing and create innovative microcredit alternatives. This international movement is evidenced by the establishment of
the U.N.'s International Year of Microcredit in 2005, during which member states have created new initiatives to foster innovation and development of MFIs through regulatory changes and partnerships with the
private sector. 16 But the new initiatives face the unique nature and challenges of MFIs and must create alternatives to fit those characteristics
into a sustainable model.
B.

TYPES OF MICROLENDING INSTITUTIONS

(MLIs)

An accumulating savings and credit association is one example of an
MFI. MFI applies to any formal organization whose primary activity is
microfinance, ranging from credit unions to public funds fully sponsored
by local governments.' 7 MFIs can range from informal community initiatives, to cooperative organizations, to more traditional lending institutions. The Accumulation Savings and Credit Association is one example
of an MFI. 18 All of its members save the same fixed amount regularly
12. Gord Cunningham, Microfinance: Flavour of the Month or Practical Development
Alternative?, Conference Presentation at the Yukon Economic Forum: Ideas Summit (Mar. 25, 2000), available at http://www.coady.stfx.ca/resources/publications/
publications-presentations-microfinance.html.); See History of Microfinance,
supra note 3.
13. A Short History of Grameen Bank, GRAMEEN BANKING FOR THE POOR 1998,

http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/hist.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
14. MARGUERITE S. ROBINSON, THE MICROFINANCE REVOLUTION 25 (2001).
15. About the Consultative Group to Aid the Poor, http://www.cgap.org (last visited

Sept. 9, 2005).
16.

Who's Involved-National Committees, INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF MICROCREDIT
2005, http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/pages/whosinvolved/whosinvolvednationalcommittees.asp (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
17. Basics of Regulation: Glossary, Consultative Group to Aid the Poor, http://micro
financegateway.org/resource-centers/reg-sup/ basics/glossary (last visited Sept. 11,

2006).
18. CGAP Savings Information Resource Center, Consultative Group to Aid the
Poor, http://www.microfinancegateway.org/resource-centers/savings/ (last visited
Sept. 11, 2006).
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and can borrow from the group at an interest charge. 19 The interest return is then distributed among the group. 20 Postal Savings Banks are
more traditional examples of MFIs. They operate much like regular
banks, but they tend to serve mostly rural communities through local pos21
tal offices and offer more flexible terms than commercial banks. While
MFIs vary significantly in nature and scope, MLIs are the most common
type of MFI. MLIs consist mostly of non-profit organizations that focus
only on providing credit and often receive support from the government
or international organizations. 22 The main focus of MLIs is to provide
loans to clients that cannot access the formal banking system. Most MLI
beneficiaries are rural entrepreneurs and people working in the informal
economy. 23 The loans usually range from single-digit dollar amounts to
approximately US $1,000 and often do not require collateral or credit
checks. 24 While some MLIs, such as Bolivia's BancoSol and Mexico's
Compartamos have begun to seek private investors, 25 most depend solely
on grants from governments, international development banks, and donors. 26 Dependency on grant funding is the main factor that limits the
ability of MLIs to reach self-sufficiency. This challenge of self-sufficiency
has become the recent focus of the microfinancing movement.
III.

LEGAL BARRIERS TO THE SUSTAINABILITY OF MFIS

This section discusses the most important and common legal barriers
that prevent MFI sustainability and self-sufficiency. MFIs are often unsustainable and not self-sufficient because they cannot self-fund by accepting client deposits. This problem, in turn, is mostly due to the
inability of MFIs to comply with minimum capital requirements and
other regulatory measures, such as targeting and loss prevention. The
other significant factor that stands between MFIs and long-term sustainability is the many legal barriers that prevent MFIs from transforming
into formal banking institutions when they have the ability to operate as
such. This section explores those two main barriers to sustainability and
provides the background for discussion of the types of legal and regulatory changes that would foster MFI growth and success.
19. Id.
20. SAVINGS

SERVICES FOR THE POOR: AN OPERATIONAL GUIDE

(Madeline Hirsch-

land, ed., 2005).
21. Id.
22.

ANDREY GIDASPoV, THE U.S. RUSSIA CTR. FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP, CURRENT
TRENDS IN THE RUSSIAN MICROFINANCE SECTOR

(2002), http://www.cfe.ru/eng/

center/?aid=35.

23. Eduardo Kaplan, Backgrounder: Microlending, INITIATIVE FOR POLICY DIALOGUE, http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/J-microlending.html (last visited Sept.

11, 2006).
24. Id.

25. Id.
26. Id.

184

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 12
A.

MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS

One of the main legal barriers to the profitability and sustainability of
MFIs is the requirement, present in most countries' regulatory structures,
of a fixed amount of minimum starting capital in order to perform certain
financial services, such as taking consumer deposits. A state sets high
capital requirements to ensure the stability of the state's financial system
by allowing only those institutions that have enough capital to endure
fluctuations in the market and survive unforeseen challenges to enter the
market. 27 High capital requirements are also intended to prevent the
over fragmentation of the banking system, which could lead to regulatory
challenges.2 8 Currently the trend towards further tightening capital requirements has swept a number of European central banks, particularly
in Eastern European countries such as Moldova and Romania.2 9 This
trend may be due to the fact that, as Eastern European countries prepare
for potential entry into the European Union, they have begun to focus on
the stabilization of their markets, even at the expense of development
efforts such as microfinancing.
While capital requirements serve an important purpose-one highlighted by numerous international financial agreements, such as the Basel
Principles 3 0-they create a strong impediment to the development of
MFIs. The reason is that they require disproportionately large investments for small-scale projects in the risky environments in which MFIs
operate. Evidence has shown that high capital requirements greatly hinder microfinancing efforts. For example, the U.N. Capital Development
Fund Project in the Kyrgyz Republic found that one of the main factors
preventing the development of MFIs in that country was its strict 20 percent reserve requirement. 31 In addition, minimum capital requirements
make the fundraising effort quite difficult for MFIs, since investors increasingly require MFIs to contribute approximately 10 percent of the
required capital. 32 When minimum capital requirements reach as high as
US $5 million, as they do in many countries, few MFIs have the capital
and infrastructure to make such a substantial investment. 3 3 The chilling
effect of high capital requirements on MFIs is so clear that at least one
country has begun to strategically tighten its requirements in order to
27.

Charlotte Gray et al., Sustainability of Microfinance Banks: The Ultimate Goal, 8
LAW IN TRANSITION, Nov. 23, 2003, http://www.ebrd.com/pubslegal/OL03c.pdf
#search=%22Charlotte%20Gray%20%20Sustainability%20of%20Microfinance%
20Banks%3A%20the%20Ultimate%2OGoalv%2C%22 (last visited Sep. 11, 2006).

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. KYRGYZ REPUBLIC UNDP MICROFINANCE PROJECT DOCUMENT (1999), http://
www.uncdf.org/english/microfinance/ documentsandreports/countryfeasibility/
kyrgyzdb.php.

32. Id.
33. How To REGULATE AND SUPERVISE MICROFINANCE? - KEY ISSUES IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Alfred Hannig & Edward Katimbo-Mugwanya eds.,
2000), available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/content/article/detail/2661.
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raise entry barriers on MFIs and drive smaller MFIs out of business. In
1999, Indonesia introduced 34capital requirements as part of a policy to foster fewer and larger MFIs.
B.

INTEREST RATE CAPS

Another important barrier to the profitability and independent survival
of MFIs is the establishment of blanket interest rate caps that fail to consider the disproportionately high transaction costs and risky environments in which MFIs operate. Many countries have implemented ceilings
on the allowable interest rate charges for loans that are designed to prevent predatory lending and abuse of power on behalf of financial institutions. 3 5 Because these interest rate limits usually take into consideration
the main stream banking system, of which the MFIs are not a part of,
they are based on estimates of appropriate transaction costs, returns, and
risk premiums that apply to the commercial banking industry, but not to
MFIs. MI transaction costs, for example, tend to be proportionately
much higher than their commercial counter parts, due to the small size of
their loans that nonetheless require most of the same administrative and
management expenses as regular loans. Therefore, in order to be profitable, MFIs require a higher interest rate that covers their costs and adjusts
for the unique environment in which they operate.
Another reason why MFIs require higher interest rates is because
MFIs lend to the poorest of entrepreneurs without safeguards such as
collateral or credit ratings, their risk ratios are much higher, and they
need higher interest rates to make up for their potential losses. Several
illustrations of the negative effects of low interest rate caps on MFI performance have emerged in the last few years. For example, in Nicaragua,
the Association of Nicaraguan MFIs reported that their members' portfolios fell from 30 percent to less than 2 percent after the government introduced an interest rate ceiling in 2001.36 In West Africa the introduction
of a 27 percent interest rate cap has led to the divestment of MEFIs from
rural areas to areas where it is cheaper to sell and that have increased
loan minimums. 37 Today approximately forty developing countries have
interest rate ceilings that limit the ability of microlenders to grow at natural rates and force them to keep their rates down by increasing the size of
their loans and rejecting risky investors, thereby excluding the very audi38
ence they are designed to target.
34.

HAMiD RUSTAMOV, BETTER PRACTICES FOR SCALING-UP RURAL MICROFINANCE
IN TAJIKISTAN

(2004), http://www.policy.hu/rustamov/Interim%20activity%20re-

port.pdf.
35. Brigit Helms & Xavier Reille, Interest Rate Ceilings and Microfinance: The Story
So Far, CGAP OCCASIONAL PAPER, No. 9. Sept. 2004, availableat http:www.micro
financegateway.org/files/21796-10.pdf.

36. Ann Duval, The Impact of Interest Rate Ceilings on Microfinance, CGAP
BRIEF,

37. Id.
38. Id.

May 2004, http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/21628_53.pdf.
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While the annualized percentage rates (APR) of MFIs, on average,
tend to be more than twice those of commercial banks, they ate also approximately a tenth of the rates charged by their counterparts in the informal market. For example, in Bangladesh, the commercial APR is
between 10 and 13 percent, the MFI APR is approximately 20 to 35 percent, and the informal sources APR is approximately 180 to 240 percent. 39 This example shows that while MEIs have to charge higher
interest rates on average, they are significantly preferable to the rates
charged in the informal market. In this sense, the establishment of interest rate ceilings actually harms the poorest borrowers by leaving them out
of the MFI market and forcing them into predatory lending outfits. The
data also shows that interest rate ceilings have a significant impact in the
market penetration of MFIs. A study of twenty-three countries, some
with ceilings and some without, found that those countries with MFI ceilings had a market penetration rate of approximately 4.6 percent while
countries without ceilings had a penetration of approximately 20.2 percent. 40 Therefore, it is clear that the effect of interest rate caps of MFI
performance is not only to force them to stop serving the poorest clients,
but also to greatly limit their scope and growth.
IV.

POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES TO ADDRESS THE LEGAL
BARRIERS TO SUSTAINABILITY

It is clear that in order to overcome the obstacles to sustainability mentioned in the previous section, countries must implement initiatives that
will foster the self-sufficiency of MFIs and will provide the right environment for their expansion and success. There have been countless proposed alternatives offered by the international development community
to address this problem. But two potential solutions have earned the
most attention and discussion and this paper shall focus on those. The
first proposed alternative involved the creation of regulatory windows
that allow regulatory agencies to apply lower capital and risk prevention
standards to MFIs. 41 But this paper will argue that it is a different alternative that best addresses the current barriers in a swift and timely manner and is most likely to provide a long-term solution to the legal barriers
mentioned. This alternative involves the creation and encouragement of
official MFI partnerships with commercial banks in order to benefit from
their capital base and security measured while still being able to reach
poor borrowers and savers. In order to explore the merits of this solution, this paper shall first carefully explore the arguments for and against
the other proposals and ultimately compare those to the one suggested.
39. Id.
40. Helms & Reille, supra note 35.
41. Robert Peck Christen & Richard Rosenberg, The Rush to Regulate: Legal
Frameworksfor Microfinance, CGAP OCCASIONAL PAPER, No. 4, April 2000, at 1,
availableat http://www.cgap.org/docs/OccasionalPaper_04.pdf.
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REGULATORY WINDOWS

The argument for the creation of a regulatory window that allows for
lower minimum capital requirements and higher allowed interest rates for
MFIs, centers around the fact that MFIs are meeting a need unmet by the
commercial banks and should be given regulatory support through less
strict requirements. 42 The first premise of the argument is that MFIs are
the only groups that are truly reaching the poorest clientele, a group that
has been completely left out of the formal banking system as it currently
exists. But these organizations often have to depend on grants and donations since they are unable, by law, to take deposits from their clients. 43
The reason for this is that the capital and risk measures contained in the
licensing requirements they must meet in most countries, in order to begin accepting savings deposits, are unreasonably high considering the nature and scope of MFIs and are therefore unachievable targets. 44
According to this argument, therefore, the best solution would be to create a separate regulatory category for MFIs that contains more realistic
(namely lower) standards that take into account the limited resources and
unique roles of these institutions. 45 This new category would allow for
the issuance of financial licenses (government certificates attesting to the
financial soundness of an institution and permitting it to take deposits) to
MFIs that formerly could not meet the licensing standards.
The goal of this approach would be to allow MFIs to gain self-sustainability by self-funding through deposits and encourage the entry into
the market of new MFI organizations attracted by the stability of a licensing system. 46 The first argument is that licensing guidelines would cause
existing MFIs to self-regulate and focus their efforts by setting new performance targets guided by the licensing requirements. 4 7 This may also
result in the formation of partnerships or mergers between MFIs in order
to reach those targets, leading to the combination of resources, experience, and expertise of several institutions. The second part of the argument suggests that the MFI licensing regime would attract the entry into
the MFI market of organizations that previously had been dissuaded by
lack of funding possibilities and the risks associated with a purely unregulated system. 48 This new licensing system would have the added value of
allowing for the formal regulation of MFIs, thereby better protecting the
interest of MFl clients and preventing some of the problems that plague
some MFIs such as exorbitant interest rates and unstable capital bases. 49
This argument has already gained significant popularity in a number of
countries which have responded by implementing entire systems of regu42. Id.

43. Id. at 12.
44. Id.
45. Id.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 13.
Christen & Rosenberg supra note 41.
Id.
Id.
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latory requirements designed exclusively to foster the creation and success of MFIs. One of the countries that has been most successful in
implementing such measures is the Philippines. Through the General
Banking Law of 200050 and supplemented by the Circular 273,51 the Philippines permitted MFIs to convert into thrift banks or rural banks, which
are low regulatory requirement banks that focus on serving the poor, in
order to allow for the creation of banks focused specifically on
microfinancing efforts. In addition, they adapted the regulatory requirements of these new banks to fit the microfinancing model, allowing for
starting capital requirements as low as US $93,000.52 The General Banking Law specifically mentioned the special needs of MFIs as the source of
the new measures stating, "the Monetary Board shall recognize the peculiar characteristics of microfinancing, such as cash flow-based lending to
the basic sectors that are not covered by traditional collateral. ' 53 The
General Banking Law and subsequent Circular allowed for MFIs to be
subject to much lower capital minimums and other regulatory requirements while giving them official license to take deposits and utilize them
as their main source of funding. 54 The Philippines has already seen easy
success stories such as the Opportunity Microfinance Bank (OMB), the
first non-collateral microfinance bank established in 2001 through a
merger of five non-governmental organizations. By 2002, the OMB was
serving 19,000 with a lending portfolio of US $1.05 million and deposits of
US $542,000. 55 The Philippines is seen as one of the most compelling
pieces of evidence supporting the introduction of licensing windows to fit
the need of microfinance banks.
But while licensing windows may allow for the self-sufficiency of some
MFIs there are significant drawbacks to their introduction that should be
carefully considered. First, the elimination of interest rates limits will be
a difficult political battle in the countries that currently have them. 56 This
is so because the public often does not understand the counter-intuitive
idea that higher interest rates could actually benefit rather than harm
microborrowers in the long run by giving them access to some formal
lending rather than forcing them into the much higher rates of the informal market. 57 In addition, the financial industry lobby will likely oppose
50. An Act Providing for the Regulation of the Organization and Operations of
Banks, Quasi-Banks, Trust Entities and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 8791,
§ 3 (2000), available at http://www.bsp.gov.ph/regulations/gbl2000/gbl2000_a.htm

[hereinafter General Banking Law of 2000].
51. Circular No. 273, Series of 2001, § 1 (2001), available at http://www.bsp.gov.ph/
Archive/Regulations_2001/Circulars/circular273.htm.
52. Id. § 1(3).
53. General Banking Law of 2000, supra note 50, § 40.
54. Circular No. 273, supra note 51, § 3.
55. Opportunity Microfinance Bank Celebrates its First Anniversary, ADB FINANCE
FOR THE POOR (A Quarterly Newsletter of the Focal Point for Microfinance),

Sept. 2002, Vol. 3, No. 3, at 8, available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/Microfinance/finance 200233.pdf.
56. See Christen & Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 7.
57. Id.
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special interest rate exceptions for MFIs that will make their rates less
competitive in comparison, even if they are targeting different audiences.
In developing countries where a majority of borrowers tend to be small in
size, the competition between formal institutions and MFIs may not be as
distant as one might imagine. But even if the government manages to
successfully eliminate interest rates for MFIs, another potential drawback
is that a combination of the introduction of a licensing system with a
lower minimum capital requirement and higher allowable interest rates
could lead to undesirable harms to MFI customers. For example, if, as is
argued above, the implementation of performance targets that will allow
an MFI to gain a license will lead them to tighten their operations, this
will likely mean that they will either be forced to increase the size and
lower the risk of their loans, or charge much higher interest rates. If the
first scenario occurs, it would create one of the very problems that the
regulation window is design to avoid, namely it will leave the smallest and
riskiest borrowers out of the MFI market and force them back into the
informal sector. If the latter alternative is pursued, it could result in the
emergence of artificially higher interest rates that would not only harm
the MFIs existing clients, but could also result in unsustainable operations
that will be difficult to uphold once the license is granted. In essence, the
tightening of MFI operations to comply with licensing requirements,
however relaxed they may be compared to the existing standards, could
still result in pricing out the neediest borrowers, or creating unsustainable
rates that might then lead to instability and possible default once the license is granted and the rates return to equilibrium levels.
Another important drawback is the potential burden on the regulatory
authorities that would arise from the proliferation of new small banking
institutions that are difficult to regulate. This proliferation could overburden the regulating authorities and threaten the stability of the country's banking system. This scenario is worsened by the fact that the
smaller the institution, the less formal its processes, the harder it will be
to supervise, and the more administrative resources it will occupy for
monitoring and regulation. An example of this potential drawback occurred in the Philippines where the proliferation of small rural banks resulted in these small banks representing 83 percent of the banks the
regulatory agency had to supervise while accounting for only 2 percent of
the nation's deposits. 58 The ineffective regulation that could result from
an overburdening of the regulatory authorities and increased complexity
of regulation arising from less formal banks could create dangerous results for the future of MFIs. For example, the poor regulation and overexpansion of MFIs that are not ripe for self-sufficiency, but take
advantage of the regulatory window, could result in the threat of defaulting MFIs, which would chill investor confidence and possibly hinder further growth. 59 In addition, poorly regulated deposit institutions could
58. Duval, supra note 36, at 5.
59. Christen & Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 15.
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weaken the confidence of borrowers and depositors, threatening the stability of the MFI system as a whole. 60 A potential outcome would be that
premature licensing of MFIs that are not ready for sustainability and regulation could send negative signals about the MFI market in general,
stunting the growth of this emerging industry. A better way to approach
the licensing question would be to find a way to foster increased profitability and sustainability of MFIs and faze them into the licensing system
rather than establishing a blanket of weaker guidelines that could lead to
the corruption of the market. One effective way of preparing MFIs for
sustainability and ripeness for regulation would be to create partnerships
between established commercial banks and existing and new MFIs, allowing the MFIs to benefit from the economies of scale, stability, and risk
management of the larger institutions while still being able to reach their
target microloan clients. 61 The next section will explore the benefits and
downsides of such an alternative.
B.

PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN COMMERCIAL BANKS AND

MFIs

One way for MFIs to achieve self-sufficiency is for them to partner with
commercial banks that can use their increased capital, lower transaction
costs, better risk profiles, and larger, more profitable deposit investment
alternatives to give the MFIs the starting capital and low administrative
costs they need in order to reach long-term profitability. 62 The capital
and stability provided by these partnerships would allow MFIs to eventually meet the capital requirements and interest rate levels needed to earn
independent banking licenses, and with them, the ability to take deposits
as a way to reach self-sustenance. Alternatively, these partnerships can
be a permanent relationship through which the MFIs can focus on expanding their reach, scope, and range of services. The commercial banks
can also stand to greatly benefit from these partnerships by reaching new
previously untapped markets of small borrowers, hedging their risk
through the less volatile microloan market, and utilizing the expertise and
unique practices of experienced MFIs. This section will explore the benefits of such partnerships to MFIs and commercial banks and will then
explore ways to address some of the potential downsides that could arise
from this arrangement.
There are three main benefits of the partnership approach in comparison to the regulation window approach mentioned above: greater stability and profitability from increased access to capital, lower transaction
costs leading to lower interest rates, and better client reach and provision
of service through the application of advances in technology used by commercial banks. The first benefit arises from the fact that a partnership
will give MFIs a stable and robust source of capital that will allow them to
gradually increase their stability and growth. It would also allow for in60. Id.
61. Id. at 18.

62. Id.
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creased profitability through the bank's larger and higher-return depositinvestment alternatives, thereby increasing the MFIs profitability. An illustration of the potential benefits derived from such a system is the SunLink bank linkage model pioneered by the NGO Pride Africa. 63
Through this system, a commercial bank provides financial backing and a
line of credit that allows MFIs to meet the requirements for a banking
license. 64 MFIs then accept deposits from clients and manage the aggregation of deposits that is then invested into the commercial bank. 65 The
bank is then able to invest these aggregate deposits more profitably than
would the MIFI itself since it has larger, more profitable investment opportunities and higher margins due to its aggregate capital. 66 This allows
the commercial bank to serve a downstream market without having to
manage the transaction costs of multiple depositors. 67 The risk is thereby
absorbed between the two entities, allowing for more profitability. 68 In
this way, the provision of capital not only benefits the MFIs through increased stability and profitability, but also provides commercial banks
69
with alternatives for growing their market reach.
A second significant benefit is that the diminished transaction costs associated with the more advanced and efficient operation systems of commercial banks would allow the MFI to lower its interest charges, which
would address the problem of interest rate ceilings that currently limit the
success of MFIs. A partner commercial bank provides banking overhead
services that lower the MFIs transaction costs and are less costly to the
bank, due to economies of scale. One example of the potential for lowering transaction costs through private partnerships is the recent agreement
between Visa International and the Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA). Visa will provide all its electronic loan payment and deposit management services for FINCA to manage its clients'
accounts. 70 The system will allow FINCA to process loans automatically,
minimizing loan transaction times and lowering transaction costs. 71 In
addition, Visa's industry-leading transaction security system will prevent
mismanagement and provide borrowers more secure access to their loan
capital. 72 This increased security will also lead to lower capital leakage
through system deficiencies that will further lower transaction costs, al63. Pride Africa, Banking on Africa - Commercial Bank Linkages with Microfinance
Institutions, ITDG PUBLISHING (ALTERNATIVE FINANCE: MICROFINANCE ARTICLE LIBRARY) (2002), http://www.alternative-finance.org.uk/cgi-bin/summary.pl?id
=148.
64. Id.
65. Gray et al., supra note 27.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. News Releases, USAID, FINCA International and Visa Announce Microfinance
Partnership: Partnership Targets Next Generation of Microfinance, (Jan. 24, 2004),
http://www.corporate.visa.com/md/nr/press210.jsp.
71. Gray et al., supra note 27.
72. Id.
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lowing the MFI to charge lower interest rates. The Visa/FINCA partnership is a model for the ways that MFIs can leverage the operational
resources of commercial institutions to lower their transaction costs and
provide lower-cost capital to their clients.
The third category of benefits that would arise from these partnerships
extends beyond overcoming interest and capital regulatory requirements
as barriers to sustainability. The technology advanced by the larger, more
profitable commercial banks will allow MFIs to expand their reach and
scope to encompass communities that are currently underserved in the
microcredit market. For example, the robust computerized record system
and account maintenance processes established by commercial banks will
allow MFIs to more efficiently manage and supervise their clients' accounts in order to maximize reliability, timely reporting, and accountability. These improvements will not only allow MFIs to maximize the
utilization rate of their funds, but will also prevent the capital leakage and
resource waste that is common to poorly managed MFIs. One illustration
of the benefits of using the technological advances of commercial banks
to improve MFI services is that of Banrural in Guatemala. Banrural has
introduced new pocket computer systems that have allowed microlenders
to reach remote, practically inaccessible communities in the most rural
areas of Guatemala. 73 It has also introduced digital fingerprinting technologies that have provided microlenders with an opportunity to circumvent the illiteracy barrier to the formal lending process. 74 Another
example is the ICICI bank in India that has formed partnerships with
numerous MFIs around the country. 75 ICICI is building a network of
thousands of village internet kiosks that will deliver banking services
throughout rural India.76 These examples are some of the many ways
that the high-tech operation systems used by commercial banks will allow
MFI partners to expand their lending ability and scope to include the
most underserved and isolated microentrepreneurs.
Partnerships would also benefit the commercial banks in three main
ways. First, partnering with MFIs would allow them to reach a new market and benefit from the MFIs' expertise and aggregating operations so
that the bank can mitigate the high transaction costs associated with small
loans and the learning curve of the new business. The SunLink model
mentioned above is an illustration of this benefit. 7 7 Through it, the MFI
collects small deposits into client groups that it then transfers to the commercial bank as single accounts. 78 This allows the commercial bank to
serve a downstream market without having to manage the transaction
73. Elizabeth Littlefield & Richard Rosenberg, Microfinance and the Poor: Breaking
Down the Walls between Microfinance and FormalFinance, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, June 2004, Vol. 41, No. 2, at 38, 40, available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/fandd/2004/06/index.htm.
74. Id.
75. Id.

76. Id.
77. Pride Africa, supra note 63, at 4.
78. Id.
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costs of multiple depositors. 79 In addition, the MFIs expertise in attracting microborrowers, identifying their needs, and managing unique
relationships with them are strategic advantages that the bank would lack
if it attempted to reach the clients itself.80 In this way, the commercial
bank can expand its reach to a lower income market without having to go
through the growing pains and steep learning curves associated with market entry.
In addition, while smaller loans may be seen as riskier, there is an advantage to microbusiness. The decreased vulnerability of microbusinesses to stock market and other economic fluctuations compared to
their larger counterparts could provide hedging potential for some types
of risk. Evidence of the potential for this hedging phenomenon is provided by two recent examples in Indonesia and Bolivia. During the 1997
Indonesian financial crisis and the 2001-2003 Bolivian banking crisis,
MFIs proved to be significantly less sensitive to the economies' fluctuations and their risk profiles remained significantly stable compared to
those of commercial banks. 8 1 During the Indonesian crisis, while commercial bank portfolios plummeted, repayment among the largest MFI in
the country, Bank Rakyat Indonesia, hardly declined at all. During the
Bolivian banking crisis, one telling measure of the significant difference
in risk-sensitivity between commercial banks and MFIs was the average
of Portfolios at Risk (PARs), namely loans overdue by more than thirty
days. For commercial banks, the average PAR went from 6.5 percent in
1999 to an alarming 17.6 percent at the peak of the crisis in 2002. Meanwhile, the average PAR for MFIs in Bolivia only fluctuated between 6.2
percent at the beginning of the crisis and 9.1 percent at its peak, returning
to 7.2 percent in 2002, more than ten percentage points below the average
for the commercial banks that year. 82 Finally, the bank could benefit
from the higher interest income earned by MFI loans which, as discussed
above, are sometimes twice that of the normal commercial bank APR.
One of the banks recognizing these potential benefits is Credit Swisse,
which recently entered a partnership with a number of MFIs through the
Responsibility Global Microfinance Fund. 8 3 The bank's main stated goal
in the partnership is to provide assistance to MFIs and earn a high social
return while earning an adequate financial return, Credit Suisse management also cites excellent repayment ratios and favorable interest rates as
reasons why microfinancing partnerships are mutually beneficial. 84 The
MFI data from Bolivia and Peru show strong evidence supporting this
79.
80.
81.
82.
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perception. 85 For example, data from Bolivian MFIs rated by the agency
MicroRate showed that, at the height of the Bolivian banking crisis in the
average commercial sector return of equity (ROE) went from negative 8
percent in 1999 to negative 15 percent in 2000. Meanwhile the average
ROE for the MFIs was stable during 1999 and 2000 at 7 percent. 86 A
similar example occurred in Peru where in 2001 the rated MFIs far outpaced the commercial sector with an ROE of 28 percent compared to the
commercial ROE of 4 percent. 87 These two examples show that, especially in times of financial crisis, MFIs are not only much more stable but
also significantly more profitable in proportion to their capital investment. This is further evidence that commercial banks could approach
MFI partnerships as a way to hedge against macroeconomic risks.
The partnerships, therefore, would not only present an opportunity for
MFIs to stabilize, reach self-sufficiency, and grow their scope and profitability, but they would also give the commercial banks an opportunity to
benefit from MFI's expertise in reaching a new, lower-income bracket
and take advantage of the decreased sensitivity of MFIs to
macroeconomic forces in order to hedge the risk of their commercial
portfolios.
There are, however, some potential drawbacks to the prospect of partnerships between commercial banks and MFIs. One such drawback is
that MFIs are often started and managed by NGOs that may be weary
about partnering with a commercial bank, which they may perceive as not
sharing their focus and approach to microlending. There is a long-standing divide in organizational cultures between NGO's approach to
microfinancing and the business world that may lead some MFI managers
to be reluctant to trust commercial bank managers with their clients. 88 A
more concrete version of this problem could be that commercial banks,
which traditionally focus more on profit and risk than microfinancing as
development aid, may be reluctant to take on the poorest and riskiest
clients or the smallest loans. That is, the microlending practices of MFIs
will likely not fit the traditional parameters of commercial lending, and
will have to be treated as a completely separate category subject to very
different standards. But this potential drawback could be addressed by
designing the partnership's parameters in a way that will allow the MFI to
continue servicing its clients and using its risk and return models, while
providing it with the economies of scale robustness of funding and risk
management that the commercial banks possess. The partnership could,
85. Damian von Stauffenberg, Trends in Latin American Microfinance, MICRoBANKING BULLETIN, Nov. 2002, at 19, 20, available at http://www.mixmbb.org/en/mbbissues/08/Trends%20in %20LA %20Microfinance.PDF#search= %22 %22Trends%
20in%20Latin%20American%20Microfinance%22%22.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See generally Julia Verbrugge, The Challenges of Managing Microfinance Projects
in Latin America, ITDG PUBLISHING (ALTERNATIVE FINANCE: MICROFINANCE
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2006]

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

for example, give the MFI management authority over loan decisions
while allowing the commercial bank to manage the deposit operations.
These decisions could be subject to a number of pre-agreed standards
that could be negotiated between the commercial bank and the MFI prior
to the formation of the partnership. In exchange for the preservation of
authority over lending, the commercial bank could be given authority
over the management and investment of deposit funds. In addition the
commercial bank could require its partner to contribute to the funding of
risk-prevention measures such as loan insurance, which would likely be
made affordable by the commercial bank's risk-hedging potential and the
economies of scale that are common to the commercial bank's
operations.
Another potential drawback of the partnerships is the unilateral risk
assumption by banks that requires them to invest in partnering with MFIs
without being able to internalize or profit from any of the positive social
externalities associated with economic development. While MFIs may
prove to be profitable investments once the partnership is stable, the initial investment will nonetheless be highly risky, judging from the fact that
only about 1 percent of MFIs are currently sustainable. 89 Since partnerships between banks and MFIs are a relatively new concept, it will be
difficult for banks to initially determine the risk involved in their venture.
This is aggravated by the fact that in most countries there is little or no
formal financial supervision of NGO-run MFIs since they do not have
formal financial institution licenses. This also means that there are currently few official rating systems of efficiency and financial stability that
would allow the bank to determine the risk involved with particular
NGOs. The low predictability and high-risk characteristics of MFI investments may make them less attractive to banks and may prevent the public-private partnership movement from growing.
But there are several possible solutions to address this potential problem. First, the governments of countries where these partnerships are established could potentially introduce default protection or other
insurance incentives that will mitigate the risk associated with MFIs. In
addition, they can encourage the country's rating agencies to introduce
specialized rating and measurement systems to evaluate the performance
and risk of MIFIs, and help commercial banks decide on which will be a
better investment. Alternatively, the governments could directly contract
out or subsidize the rating responsibilities to private rating organizations.
There are already organizations that are dedicated to applying financial
rating principles to MFIs. For example, MicroRate was the first rating
company to focus exclusively on MFIs and rates approximately 200 MFIs
in Africa and Latin America. 90 Their system does not employ solely
traditional rating tools but rather assesses MFI risk using a tailored evalu89. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 2, at 7.
90. MicroRate, The Company, http://www.microrate.com/ENGLISHsite/ABOUT/
aboutf.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
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ation system that assesses the financial health of the MFI, its portfolio
quality, information systems, and internal controls, by applying standards
that reflect the unique context of the microlending practice. 91 Commercial banks could require such rating analysis from potential MFI partners
in order to better measure their risk. In addition, governments could subsidize this process to broaden the scope of rated MFIs. This would not
only foster partnerships by making risk more manageable and measurable, but would also incentivize MFIs to improve their financial and management techniques in order to improve their ratings and increase their
likelihood of commercial support. This potential is evidenced by the
MicoRate example, which has found that rated MFIs showing progress
through the evaluation process have found the process to be a strong incentive for attracting founders. 92 This solution could thereby not only
help create more stable and secure partnerships, but also raise the level of
transparency, professionalism, and efficacy for the MFI industry in
general.
It appears, therefore, that the most significant drawbacks associated
with the partnership concept can be mitigated through effective partnership structuring and increased oversight of MFIs. When weighing these
manageable concerns against the significant potential benefits of greater
profitability, stability, and growth for MFIs, and market expansion and
risk hedging for commercial banks, the risk utility analysis makes commercial-MFI partnerships an option with the potential for great success.
The following section will address recommendations
V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The stabilization and increased profitability of MFIs that can be
achieved through commercial partnerships will allow the microfinancing
industry to move into a new stage of significant growth and scope expansion that will likely make a significant impact in development finance.
These partnerships seem to be the perfect way to combine the benefits of
the unique expertise of specialized MFIs with the greater funding capabilities, structure, security, and technological advances of private industries.
While MFIs and commercial banks will clearly be the leading actors in
this effort, in order for it to be successful, governments, international development banks, and international organizations must cooperate with
these primary actors to create economic incentives, financial assurances,
technical assistance, and regulatory and legal tools that facilitate the implementation and management of such partnerships. In order to achieve
this goal, there are a number of strategies that should be implemented by
the government and international actors.
First, there must be an effort by the governments of developing countries to create a legal and regulatory environment that allows commercial
91. Id.
92. Id.
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banks to enter into such partnerships. Several countries have already undertaken such initiatives. For example, in Pakistan the government introduced, in 2001, the Microfinance Sector Development Program, a
package of legal reforms and initiatives designed, in part, to facilitate the
93
regulation and development of commercial bank-MFI partnerships.
Such efforts are also being undertaken at the international level. For example, in 2004 the Group of Eight Countries announced an action plan to
increase access to microfinance, which will focus on identifying the regulatory and legal barriers to the establishment of commercial bank-MFI
partnerships and work on reforming the applicable laws to facilitate and
encourage such initiatives. 94 Countries that wish to promote commercial
bank-MFI partnerships should follow this model in identifying the tax,
interest rate regulation, and financial regulation barriers to partnerships
and in introducing regulatory reforms that will address the unique challenge of integrating the microlending practice into a commercial
framework.
In addition, the international development banks and organizations,
such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, the U.N. Capital Development Fund, and
others, should make a concerted effort to offer commercial institutions,
that are considering entering into such partnerships, extensive technical
assistance and advice to help them chose the right MFI partners and partnership structures that allow both parties to derive the greatest benefit
from the others' competitive advantage, while maintaining their unique
strengths and mitigating risk. These organizations should invest in exploring the best contractual arrangements for such partnerships in order
to provide potential partners with the best advice on the structure that
best fits their particular context. These large organizations would be in
the best position to provide such advice and guidance due to their extensive resources, relationships with the MFI world, and developed expertise
on the special financial environments of different regions.
These groups could form partnerships with the leading microfinance
NGOs such as ACCION and FINCA, which have already begun looking
into private-public partnership alternatives, and work with them to develop best practices as well as pass along advice and information gained
from their experiences to future partnerships. They can also work on actively creating partnership models that are tailored to specific regional
needs by working with NGOs like Pride Africa that have developed region-specific partnership strategies. The international organizations may
even sponsor pilot partnerships by providing financial backing and insurance for commercial financial institutions to explore different potential
partnership structures in a control and risk-managed environment. These
93. Developing Non Bankable Territories for Financial Services, USAID Pakistan,
Fourth Quarterly Report, Sept. 30, 2004.
94. News Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, G8 Action Plan on
Poverty (June 9, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/200406
09-35.html.

198

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 12

pilot programs could then be phased into actual independent partnerships
once they stabilize. This pilot project model would not only allow development organizations to explore the best ways to structure these partnerships, but would also allow commercial institutions to have a secure and
gradual transition into the partnerships, which would likely increase confidence and buy-in from traditionally risk-adverse financial institutions.
Another initiative that the international organizations, governments,
and NGOs could collaborate to promote these partnerships is by sponsoring or subsidizing a rating and assessment system that will measure the
financial stability and success associated with particular MFIs in order to
help commercial banks evaluate their potential partners. Such a rating
system would also encourage greater transparency and efficiency among
MFIs and would help them transition into the more organized and formal
process associated with a private partnership. A rating system would ensure that MIFIs constantly strive for more effective management and
processes, which will in turn contribute to the success of the partnerships.
The Inter-American Development bank has already invested in such a
system in collaboration with the European Union called the Microfinance
Rating and Assessment Fund (the Fund). 95 The Fund provides Credit
Risk Ratings and Global Risk Assessments of MFIs, which focus both on
default risks and on more subjective measures such as management quality and ability to meet contractual obligations. 96 The fund also focuses on
tracking progress and increasing transparency. 97 The goal of the Fund is
to increase MFI access to capital by providing commercial donors with
reliable information to facilitate their investment choices. 98 The other
development banks and international organizations should either continue to expand the scope of the Fund or use its efforts as a model by
other international organizations to establish similar rating initiatives.
Official rating systems focusing on microfinancing will provide a strong
incentive to improve current MFIs and give commercial partners the
tools they need to make informed decisions about their partnership
choices.
By implementing regulatory incentives, providing technical assistance,
and sponsoring rating systems to enable the establishment of commercialMFI partnerships, governments and international organizations will help
create an environment where commercial banks can best collaborate with
MFIs to create sustainable and far-reaching microlending programs that
could greatly increase capital access to the poor. Unlike the regulatory
window approach, which could create damaging incentives for the
proliferation of unstable and unsustainable MFIs, this approach will ensure that MIFIs become reliable, formal institutions that can provide
microlending services on a permanent basis. In this sense, the commer95. The Rating Fund, About the Fund, http://www.ratingfund.org/content.aspx?clD=3
(last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
96. Id.
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cial partnership approach is a much more conscientious, long-term answer to the need for greater funding sources for MFIs.
The increased profitability, stability, and growth potential that these
partnerships will bring to MFIs will allow them to expand their scope and
continue to foster economic growth in developing communities worldwide. In addition, the commercial partners of MFIs will be able to contribute to the development effort while reaching new markets and
hedging their risk with microloan investments that are less sensitive to
market changes and have shown substantial return on equity potential.
This effort will, therefore, greatly benefit both MFIs and commercial
banks in substantial ways. But perhaps the single most important benefit
rising from this initiative will be the strengthening of the microfinancing
industry as a stable, long-term approach to combating poverty.
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